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CASE NOTES
Environmental Law—National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 —
Procedural Requirements of the Act Must Be Followed in Good
Faith—Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. Atomic
Energy Commission. 1—In late 1968, the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) granted a construction permit to the Baltimore Gas and Elec-
tric Company for construction of the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power
Plant. Concern over the potential environmental damage that the plant
might cause led the Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, composed
of local civic groups, the Sierra Club and the National Wildlife Federa-
tion, to seek review of four AEC procedural rules' and their applica-
tion in the granting of the construction permit. In substance, the peti-
tioner charged that the AEC's procedural rules constituted a violation
of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) . The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, in holding that the Commission's
rules and their application did not conform to the provisions of NEPA,
remanded the case to the Commission for rule changes, including
further consideration of the environmental impact of the Calvert Cliffs
Nuclear Power Plant.4
The Calvert Cliffs' decision marks the first time' that a federal
court of appeals has reviewed the application of NEPA to the AEC. Of
more importance, however, the court's interpretation and rigorous ap-
plication of NEPA suggest, indeed compel, the belief that other federal
1
 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
2
 10 C.F.R. § 50, App. D, 246-50 (1971). The court's summary of these rules is found
in 449 F.2d 1109, 1116-17 (D.C. Cir. 1971):
(1) Although environmental factors must be considered by the agency's regulatory
staff under the rules, such factors need not be considered by the hearing board
conducting an independent review of staff recommendations, unless affirmatively
raised by outside parties or staff members. (2) Another part of the procedural
rules prohibits any such party from raising non-radiological environmental issues
at any hearing if the notice for that hearing appeared in the Federal Register
before March 4, 1971. (3) Moreover, the hearing board is prohibited from con-
ducting an independent evaluation and balancing of certain environmental factors
if other responsible agencies have already certified that their own environmental
standards are satisfied by the proposed federal action. (4) Finally, the Commis-
sion's rules provide that when a construction permit for a facility has been issued
before [National Environmental Policy Act] compliance was required and when
an operating license has yet to be issued, the agency will not formally consider
environmental factors or require modifications in the proposed facility until the
time of the issuance of the operating license.
a 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. (1970).
4 The AEC has promulgated new procedural rules, as mandated by the court, in 36
Fed. Reg. 18071 & 19158 (1971). They are discussed in Landau, A Postscript to Calvert
Cliffs', supra p. 705.
a In a previous decision involving NEPA's application to the AEC, this same court
of appeals held the case not yet ripe for review. Thermal Ecology Must Be Preserved v.
AEC, 433 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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agencies must now similarly reform their procedures and decision-
making processes. In effect, the Calvert Cliffs' decision further expands
federal recognition of national environmental policy. Environmental
criteria, having statutorily germinated in congressional committees,
have now matured through the judicial system and will persist in
assuming their due importance in all "major Federal actions."'
The grounds for this decision are uniquely founded upon NEPA'
This note will first examine the court's application of NEPA's provi-
sions to the AEC. In that context, the required degree of agency com-
pliance under the Act will be discussed; the mechanics of compliance
in regard to all federal agencies will then be analyzed in terms of when
the provisions of NEPA are to be considered and, once considered, how
the various data are to be collected and evaluated. Following this
examination of NEPA's application in the principal case and in gen-
eral, the decision's implications for future federal agency actions and
reviewing courts will be discussed. Finally, the expanded opportunity
for reviewing courts to compel agency compliance with the Act will
be elucidated.
The proper application of NEPA to agency actions requires ini-
tially a determination of the degree of compliance demanded by the
Act. The question of whether the statute is mandatory, or merely
hortatory, in intent influenced the court's determination of the ade-
quacy of AEC actions. Since the statute manifests both of these inten-
tions, the court in Calvert Clif s' structurally divided NEPA into two
parts. Section 101, the court found, manifests the philosophical, sub-
stantive basis of the Act through a general statement of statutory
goals :s
Congress did not establish environmental protection as
an exclusive goal; rather, it desired a reordering of priorities,
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
► The court deals with no other statute in its decision. In Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d
199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971) the court had to deal with the
effects of several statutes on an agency decision. NEPA's role in Zabel was minimal,
as the court preferred to emphasize other statutes.
8 These goals are set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970): They are intended to:
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment
for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and cul-
turally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degra-
dation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended conse-
quences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national
heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diver-
sity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit
high standards of living and a wide sharing of Iife's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum
attainable recycling of depletable resources.
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so that environmental costs and benefits will assume their
proper place along with other considerations. 9
In this respect, NEPA's goals reflect the nation's growing awareness
that environmental resources, once freely expended, now need vigilant
preservation. The measure of compliance with section 101 is that the
federal government must "use all practicable means and measures'"
at its disposal to achieve this compliance. The court indicated that
this provision "may not require particular substantive results in par-
ticular problematic instances."" Thus the Calvert Cliffs' court con-
cluded that Section 101 of the Act is general and discretionary.
In contrast, the court determined that Section 102 embodies the
critical procedural provisions of the Act. These requirements, the
court noted, reflect congressional concern in more specific areas, such
as "radiation hazards ... [and] thermal pollution.” 12 The measure of
agency compliance under section 102 is that it should be "to the fullest
extent possible." 18
 The procedures outlined in the section are specific,
not general; mandatory, not discretionary. 14 Thus the court empha-
sized "the necessity to separate the two, substantive and procedural,
standards."13
The AEC claimed that its own procedural rules satisfied the gen-
eral, substantive mandates of the Act. The court agreed that the sub-
stantive provisions embodied in section 101 do allow broad agency
discretion. However, the court ruled that full compliance with the
procedural provisions of section 102 was compulsory, desirable, and
subject to close judicial scrutiny. The court's rigid observance of these
procedural requirements formed the basis of the decision.
On the surface, the application of NEPA's procedures to agency
decision-making processes appears to be uncomplicated. The Act ba-
sically requires that any agency action be preceded by a full consid-
eration 16
 of all environmental factors and alternatives as they exist
at present or may exist in the future. Once these factors are identified
and catalogued, they are to be balanced' 7 against other criteria, such
9 449 F.2d at 1112.
19 42 U.S.C. I 4331(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
11 449 F.2d at 1112.
12 S. Rep. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1969), These two specific areas are clearly
under the aegis of the AEC.
13 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
14 449 F.2d at 1112. But see Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett,
315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970). In Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va. 1971),
the court ruled that NEPA was discretionary vis-à-vis the Safe Streets Act. 42 U.S.C.
I 3731 (1970). The Calvert Cliffs' court noted that the discretionary nature of NEPA
was derived from a consideration of the substantive goals of NEPA only, and not from
the Act's procedural mandates. 449 F.2d at 1115 n.13. It would appear that this inter-
pretation is correct. Contrary decisions may perhaps be excused on judicial inexperience
in assessing compliance with NEPA. Nonetheless, the present court should have emphasized
more strenuously its disagreement with such decisions.
16 449 F.2d at 1114 n.10.
16 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1970).
449 F.2d at 1113.
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as economic and technical feasibility. Despite their appearance of
simplicity, however, the procedures are in fact complex because in the
balancing test, numerous environmental factors must first be ascer-
tained, then weighted equal in importance to other factors. Moreover,
NEPA's provisions are not, nor could they be, intended to detail the
procedures for each of the multifarious activities regulated by federal
agencies. Instead, the Act attempts to effect its purpose by creating
a framework structured from various procedural requirements and
made cohesive by a matrix of good faith.
Before deciding how to apply NEPA's procedures, agencies as
well as courts must first determine when they apply. Two criteria are
primary in this determination: (1) the stage of project completion as
of the Act's effective date, and (2) the need for further agency ap-
proval of the project subsequent to the Act. For convenience of analy-
sis, a project may be considered to move through three stages: it may
be (a) fully completed, requiring no further agency approval; (b)
partially completed and requiring further agency approval; or (c) not
yet initiated and requiring full agency approval. Clearly, when a proj-
ect has yet to be initiated, agency approval must conform to NEPA."
When a project has been fully completed, NEPA is inapplicable. The
most complex and troublesome situation is that of partial completion.
The Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant fell within the latter category.
The Calvert Cliffs' court attempted to circumvent the problems
inhering in the partial completion situation by regarding the AEC's
licensing activities as an additional stage which other agencies do not
have to consider. Judge Wright noted that "there are two, distinct stages
of federal [AEC] approval, one occurring before the Act's effective
date and one after the date."' That is, the granting of a construction
permit for the nuclear plant preceded the granting of an operating
license. Since, in Calvert Cliffs', the operating license was a separate
stage of agency action subsequent to NEPA's effective date, the court
ruled that the AEC was required to review the entire project in ac-
cordance with the Act. It is submitted, however, that this "two-stage"
distinction was unnecessary and undesirable: unnecessary because the
remainder of the court's opinion adequately justifies NEPA's appli-
cation and enforcement without resorting to this two-stage distinction;
undesirable because it artificially attempts to distinguish AEC pro-
cedures from those of other federal agencies." Most importantly, the
distinction detracts from a proper understanding of NEPA's applica-
tion to partially completed projects.
18 gi[A]ny hearing held between January 1, 1970 and March 4, 1971 which culminates
in the grant of a permit or license is a federal action taken after the Act's effective date."
Id. at 1120 n.25.
19
 Id. at 1129 n.43.
20 It would appear that NEPA does not support Judge Wright's distinction. The
Act encompasses "Federal actions" without dlitinguishing the diverse procedures of the
several agencies. 42 P 4332(C) (1970).
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Such an understanding may be acquired by looking to the lan-
guage of the statute. NEPA speaks in terms of "creating and main-
taining" a favorable environment and "preventing and eliminating"
damage. "This dual focus . . . [of] rectifying past instances of en-
vironmental abuse as well as . . . [of] preventing future abuse" 2 ' is
recognized by the Council on Environmental Quality Interim Guide-
lines:
To the maximum extent practicable the section 102(2)
(C) procedure should be applied to further major Federal
actions having a significant effect on the environment even
though they arise from projects or programs initiated prior
to enactment of [NEPA] on January 1, 1970.2'
A critical distinction must be drawn, however, between an agency
decision to investigate environmental impacts and a decision ordering
the identification and amelioration of harmful impacts? The court's
two-stage analysis of AEC decisions unfortunately blurs the distinc-
tion. However, the remainder of the opinion indicates that NEPA
does indeed apply to unfinished projects under the authority of other
federal agencies which require further action:
Although the Act's effective date may not require instant
compliance, it must at least require that NEPA procedures,
once established, be applied to consider prompt alterations in
the plans or operations of facilities approved without com-
pliance."
As the analysis suggests, the stage at which NEPA should be
held to apply should not be difficult to discern: " [T]he degree of
the completion of the work should not inhibit the objective and thor-
ough evaluation of the environmental impact of the project as re-
quired by NEPA!i 2" If a project has been only partially completed
and it requires further agency approval, then NEPA compels evalu-
ation of its environmental impact:
21 Donovan, The Federal Government and Environmental Control: Administrative
Reform on the Executive Level, 12 B.C. Ind. & Cora. L. Rev. 541, 546 [hereinafter cited
as Donovan].
22 36 Fed. Reg. at 7727 (1971), as quoted in the court's opinion, 449 F.2d at 1129
n.43.
23 For an example of the proper understanding, see Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325
F. Supp. 99, 126 n.52 (D.C. Alas. 1971): "Accepting this evidence at its face value, it
nevertheless goes to the merits of the impact statement, not the threshold question of
whether the NEPA reporting requirements are applicable."
24 449 F.2d at 1121.
25 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728,
746 (E.D. Ark. 1970). In that case, the project was already two-thirds completed. In
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 324 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C.
1971), a canal had been authorized in 1942 and begun in 1964. The construction was
one-third completed on the canal and one-sixth completed overall. Nevertheless, the
court held that NEPA was applicable.
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Where it is not practicable to reassess the basic course of
action, it is still important that further incremental major
actions be shaped so as to minimize adverse environmental
consequences. It is also important in further action that ac-
count be taken of environmental consequences not fully eval-
uated at the outset of the project or program."
Of critical importance at this stage is the evaluation itself: the balanc-
ing and consideration of all known and suspected variables.
One of NEPA's most important evaluation procedures is the re-
quirement that an agency "include in every recommendation or report
on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment . . . a detailed
[or impact] statement. . . ."' This document, the most complex
requirement of the Act, should contain the environmental impact data
and alternatives to be considered and weighed by the agency in "a
rather finely tuned and 'systematic' balancing analysis. . . ."28 The
impact statement "aid[s] in the agencies' own decision making pro-
cess and . . . advise[s] other interested agencies and the public of
the environmental consequences of planned federal action.'"' As such,
it serves an evidentiary function for reviewing parties, including the
courts and the public, to determine whether the consideration and
balancing process adequately transpired."
If the impact statement is to fulfill the purposes of the considera-
tion and balancing process, quantifiable data, objectively compiled,
must be made available. The several components of both sides of the
balance, including the costs and benefits of all factors, must be indi-
vidually evaluated. An agency can and, indeed, must request aid from
other departments in this process!' Once compiled, the data must
be substituted for the previously unknown imponderables in the al-
gebraic balance. Absence of this data constitutes grounds for judicial
intervention to enforce NEPA. 82
The Act's standard, procedurally, is "to the fullest extent pos-
sible." Some courts have already investigated research material in
the impact statement to insure adequate conformance with this stan-
28 36 Fed. Reg. at 7727 (1971), as quoted in the court's opinion, 449 F.2d at 1.129
n.43.
27 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
28 449 F.2d at 1113.
29 Id. at 1114.
88 The court stated; "Moreover, by compelling a formal 'detailed statement' and a
description of alternatives, NEPA provides evidence that the mandated decision making
process has in fact taken place and, most importantly, allows those removed from the
initial process to evaluate and balance the factors on their own." Id. at 1114. See also
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 759
(E.D. Ark. 1971); Peterson, An Analysis of Title I of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 1 ELR 50035, 50038 n.18 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Peterson'.
81 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) and (C) (1970).
82 This is the view of 42 U.S.C. § 4332(B) (1970) taken by the court. 449 F.2d
at 1115.
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dard.88 In Daly v. Volpe," the plaintiffs were denied a preliminary
injunction to prevent construction of a bypass of an interstate highway.
Research reports from sources other than the involved federal agency
(Department of Transportation) were permitted to satisfy the impact
statement requirement of NEPA. A similar substitution for an agency's
impact statement was allowed in Sierra Club v. Hardin," where plain-
tiffs had challenged the action of the Secretary of the Interior in ap-
proving a site for mill construction. In Calvert Cliffs', the AEC did
not substitute research reports from other sources in the impact state-
ment, but it did allow outside certifying agencies to perform the re-
quired balancing process during the hearings stage of the investigation
by accepting their determinations of environmental damages and bene-
fits. This substitution was condemned by the court," which suggests
that substitution for the impact statement violates the Act. Thus the
Calvert Cliffs' court indicates that to accept "substantial compliance""
instead of demanding "strict compliance" with regard to documenta-
tion from the proper party is an underestimation and misinterpretation
of NEPA. Consequently, while quantification of the value of a stream
or the cost of restricted recreational facilities appears to be a futile,
theoretical exercise, courts have enforced NEPA, and will continue
to do so in light of Calvert Cliffs', by requiring a close analysis of these
factors."
Another procedural element which , the Calvert Cliffs' decision
may affect concerns Section 102 (C) (iii) of NEPA. That section re-
quires that "alternatives to the proposed action"39 be included in the
impact statement. Section 102 (D) specifically requires an agency to
"study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended
courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts
concerning alternative uses of available resources. . . ."4° The Calvert
Cliffs' court determined that the environmental impact of these alterna-
tives must be considered and balanced as carefully as was the original
project:
NEPA requires that an agency must—to the fullest ex-
tent possible under its other statutory obligation—consider
alternatives to its actions which would reduce environmental
83
 See Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401, 1403 (D.D.C.
1971): "The adequacy of the research should be judged in light of the scope of the
proposed program and the extent to which existing knowledge raises the possibility of
potential adverse environmental effects." This court proceeded to construct a "respon-
sible executive test" for determining the adequacy.
84 326 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Wash. 1971).
35 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alas. 1971).
36 449 F.2d at 1123.
37 326 F. Supp. 868, 870 (W.D. Wash. 1971).
88 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749,
759-61 (E.D. Ark. 1971), as cited approvingly in Calvert Cliffs', 449 F.2d at 1121 n.28.
89
 42 U.S.C.	 4332(2)(C)(iii) (1970).
40 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D) (1970).
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damage. That principle establishes that consideration of en-
vironmental matters must be more than a pro forma ritual.
Clearly, it is pointless to "consider" environmental costs
without also seriously considering action to avoid them. Such
a full exercise of substantive discretion is required at every
important, appropriate and nonduplicative stage of an agen-
cy's proceedings."
A final element considered in the Calvert Cliffs' decision involves
the role of other statutes and agencies in relation to NEPA. In the
compilation of environmental data, a federal agency does not act in
a vacuum. Other statutes and other agencies' actions interact in a
federal agency decision. For example, both NEPA and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act" are relevant to any AEC decision which
affects the environment. Some courts have somewhat illogically con-
cluded that NEPA is totally "discretionary"" and thus should yield
to the demands of less discretionary statutes." This interpretation, in
light of the Calvert Cliffs' decision, appears to be in conflict with the
mandatory provisions of NEPA. Moreover, in Calvert Cliffs', the AEC
"indicate[d] that it [would, for purposes of the impact statement,]
defer totally to water quality standards devised and administered by
state agencies and approved by the federal government under the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Ace"' The court concluded that the AEC
could not "abdicat[e]'' its function and rely on the standards of
other agencies, whose role should only be supplemental to the primary
responsibility of the AEC."
Thus the court unambiguously defined NEPA's relation to other
statutes and agency functions. This delineation is critical if NEPA's
substantive goals are to be attained. However, despite the correctness
of the decision, the opinion obscures its rationale by meandering
41 449 F.2d at 1128. See also Peterson, supra note 30. One court has suggested
that some alternatives need not be explored unless sufficient research material recom-
mends such action. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 325
P. Supp. 749, 760 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
42 10 C.F.R. § 50, App. D, at 249 (1971).
48 See Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088, 1093 (E.D. Va. 1971).
44 Id.
45 449 F.2d at 1122.
48 449 F.2d at 1124. The court correctly emphasized that "[c]ertifying agencies do
not attempt to weigh that damage against the opposing benefits. Thus the balancing re-
mains to be done." Id. at 1123. The certifying agencies may, of course, aid the federal
agency but the latter has the ultimate responsibility of consideration and balancing. If
an agency's standards are more strict than that of the certifying agency, Calvert Cliffs'
declares that the stricter standards should be enforced. Id. at 1124.
41 Id. at 1126. In Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, Civil No. 1331, 3 E.R.C. 1458
(D.D.C. Dec. 22, 1971), the court held that the Army Corps of Engineers was required
to submit an environmental impact statement under NEPA and that it could not defer
to the water quality standards of other agencies. The Kafur court approvingly cited
Calvert Cliffs' In delineating a parallel between the Corps' procedures and those of the
AEC.
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through relevant legislative hearings which are, in some instances,
unclear as to NEPA's proper relationship to other statutes." Admit-
ting that the legislature's "analysis does muddy the waters some-
what,"" the court concluded, however, that "Din cases such as this
one, the most we should do to interpret clear statutory wording is
to see that the overriding purpose behind the wording supports its
plain meaning." 5° That purpose is defined by the mandatory measure
of compliance with NEPA's procedural provisions, "to the fullest
extent possible." It is submitted that more reliance by the court on
NEPA's language, and less on the legislative hearings, would have
clarified the relation between NEPA and other statutes and agencies.
NEPA requires that, once prepared, the impact statement must
be inserted into the decision-making processes, that is, the considera-
tion and balancing processes: "[A]t a minimum . . . such information
. . . will alert the President, the Council on Environmental Quality,
the public, and, indeed, the Congress, to all known possible environ-
mental consequences of proposed agency action."' The philosophical
basis for the balancing process is admirably enunciated by the Calvert
Cliffs' court: "The point of the individualized balancing analysis is
to ensure that, with possible alterations, the optimally beneficial action
is finally taken." 52
Within this philosophical framework, difficult decisions must be
made, particularly with respect to partially completed projects which
need further agency approval. In part, these decisions are dictated by
the quantified data available, and, to the extent that this objectively
compiled data provides answers to environmental questions, the lati-
tude of agency decisions becomes necessarily restricted. Moreover,
these decisions must be made irrespective of the degree of completion
or the amount of funds already expended, for NEPA mandates that
the agency must minimize additional environmental damage "to the
fullest extent possible."
It is most apparent that the agencies' good faith, the cohesive
matrix of the entire balancing process, is of paramount importance.
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs of U.S. Army,
the court concluded: "[a]ny reasonable procedure would be adequate
so long as the 'detailed statement' requirements of the Act, along with
the other applicable provisions of § 102, are complied with." 55 The
court in Calvert Cliffs' went further, mandating that "a purely me-
chanical compliance with the particular measures required . . . will
48 See id. at 1125-26. Excerpts from those hearings may be found in 115 Cong. Rec.
40420 (1969). It is to these sections of the hearings that the court directs its attention
In Calvert Cliff?.
45 449 F.2d at 1126.
50 Id. at 1127.
51 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749,
759 (E.D. Ark. 1971)3 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (B) (1970).
52 449 F,2d at 1123.
55 325 F. Supp. at 757.
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not satisfy the Act if [it does] not amount to full good faith eonsidera=
tion of the environment."" Support for this additional demand for
good faith is found in the Council on Environmental Quality guidelines,
whose objectives are "to assist agencies in implementing not only the
letter, but the spirit of the Act.""
The Calvert Cliffs' court sarcastically questioned the presence of
the AEC's good faith:
It is difficult to credit the Commission's argument. . . .
And, in any event, the obvious sense of urgency on the part
of Congress should make clear that a transition, however
"orderly," must proceed at a pace faster than a funeral pro-
cession."
Judge Wright also chastised the Commission for intentionally delaying
consideration of environmental data until the major part of the con-
struction had been completed. Finally, the court accused the AEC of
failing to fulfill its mandated responsibility:
NEPA establishes environmental protection as an integral
part of the Atomic Energy Commission's basic mandate. The
primary responsibility for fulfilling that mandate lies with the
Commission."
In assuming the responsibility for examining agency "good faith,"
the court recognized a new role for the judiciary, a role which is im-
plicit in the Act. The source of a court's enforcement power of NEPA
lies in the Act's procedural provisions, which establish the require-
ments for agency compliance. The Calvert Cliffs' court exhaustively
reiterated the mandatory nature of these provisions. The opinion dem-
onstrates an equally cogent willingness to scrutinize agency actions
when the absence of good faith is suspected. The rigor of this scrutiny
is attested to by the tone of the decision. Sarcastic and strident lan-
guage punctuates the holding, and anger and rebuke are manifested
ubiquitously. The lack of good faith compels the court "[in its view,]
to control, at long last, the destructive engine of material 'progress.' "68
Beyond defining the duties and responsibilities of the AEC in
this case, the Calvert Cliffs' court attempted to construct guidelines
for future agency and court actions. For example, "the Commission
should consider very seriously the requirement of a temporary halt
in construction pending its review and the tackfitting' of technological
54 449 F.2d at 1112-13 n.5 (emphasis added).
55 36 Fed. Reg. at 7724 (1971), as quoted in the court's opinion 449 F.2d at 1118
n.I9 (emphasis added).
55 449 F.2d at 1121-22.
57 Id. at 1119.
Iss Id. at 111 1.
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innovations."°° In fact, a previous decision by the court contained the
harbinger of the present decision:
If the Commission persists in excluding such evidence, it is
courting the possibility that if error is found a court will re-
verse its final order, condemn its proceeding as so much waste
motion, and order that the proceeding be conducted over again
in a way that realistically permits de novo consideration of
the tendered evidence 8 0
The Commission involved in that decision was also the AEC. Thus
the present decision could not have surprised the AEC nor others who
accurately predicted the results of a proper interpretation of NEPA.°'
Quite naturally, the Calvert Cliffs' court advocated a new role for a
reviewing court; one based upon the mandatory procedural provisions
of NEPA and focusing on the involved federal agency's requisite good
faith.
Calvert Cliffs' focused upon the procedural standards of NEPA
and the statutory mandate that they be enforced to "the fullest extent
possible." In rigorously observing this standard, the Calvert Cliffs'
court outlined the proper method and measure of compliance with re-
spect to the mechanics of the consideration and balancing process.
More importantly, the court emphasized the need for the Atomic
Energy Commission, and, by implication, that of other federal agen-
cies, to act in good faith in following the Act's procedural mandates.
The impact of the good faith requirement extends not only to the role
of the agency but also to that of the reviewing court. In this respect,
the decision suggests that limitations imposed on the enforcing court
by the "discretionary" substantive provisions of the Act may be over-
come when the good faith of the agency is suspect.
As has been stated metaphorically, NEPA has gone through a
maturation process. The ultimate effect of the court in this decision
is the hastening of that maturity:
But it remains to be seen whether the promise of this legisla-
tion will become a reality. Therein lies the judicial role. . .
Our duty, in short, is to see that important legislative pur-
poses, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or mis-
directed in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy."
Overall, the Calvert Cliffs' court has given strong direction to the
Atomic Energy Commission and other federal agencies to which NEPA
applies.
AARON P. SALLOWAIt
59 Id. at 1128.
co Thermal Ecology Must Be Preserved v. AEC, 433 F.2d 524, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
61 See Donovan, supra note 21.
° 449 F.2d at 1111.
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